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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-3044 
___________ 
 
EDWARD THOMAS KENNEDY, 
                                                              Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; 
THOMAS WASSERMAN WOLF, in his official capacity and individual capacities 
 
_____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5-18-cv-03374) 
District Judge:  Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II 
_____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 21, 2018 
 
Before: KRAUSE, SCIRICA and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 24, 2018) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Edward Kennedy appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of 
his complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  For 
the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 In August 2018, Kennedy sought leave in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) with a complaint 
wherein he named the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Governor Thomas 
Westerman Wolf as defendants.1  Kennedy asked for damages as well as declaratory and 
injunctive relief as a result of defendants’ alleged actions in connection with his arrests in 
June and August 2017, and his incarceration from August 28 through August 30, 2017.  
Kennedy claimed that his complaint presented a federal question, as well as causes of 
action for “trespass,” “trespass on the case,” “trespass on the case – vicarious liability,” 
and “failure to provide a republican form of government.” 
 After concluding that Kennedy was indigent for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the 
District Court screened the complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B) and ultimately dismissed it 
for failure to state a viable claim.  This appeal followed. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a dismissal pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is de novo.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 
                                              
1  Kennedy erroneously refers to the Governor as Thomas Wasserman Wolf, rather than 
Thomas Westerman Wolf. 
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matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
570 (2007)). 
 For essentially the reasons set forth in its Memorandum Opinion, we agree with 
the District Court’s dismissal of Kennedy’s complaint for failure to state a claim.  The 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from 
claims under § 1983, and is not considered to be a “person” subject to liability for 
purposes of § 1983.  See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989).  
With respect to Governor Wolf, the District Court properly concluded that vicarious 
liability is inapplicable to § 1983 actions.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (citing Monell v. 
New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).  Given that the 
complaint is devoid of any plausible suggestions that Governor Wolf either maintained a 
policy or custom which caused Kennedy the alleged harm or that Governor Wolf had any 
personal involvement in the referenced events, the District Court was correct to conclude 
that he failed to state a viable claim.  See Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 
316 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d on other grounds, Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042 (2015).  
We further agree that Kennedy’s claims regarding the incidents of June and August 2017 
are duplicative of those asserted in Kennedy v. Hanna, E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 18-cv-00977.  
The District Court’s dismissal, without prejudice, of the claims involving the incidents of 
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June and August 2017 specifically allows Kennedy to proceed with those claims in E.D. 
Pa. Civ. No. 18-cv-00977, which is pending before the same District Court judge.2 
Kennedy appears to be arguing in his Informal Brief that the District Court 
exceeded its “jurisdiction or authority” by dismissing his complaint under § 
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  See Informal Br. at 1-2, 6.  However, the District Court had 
jurisdiction over Kennedy’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.  Given 
the conclusions of the District Court’s screening, dismissal of the complaint was proper 
under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  The remaining conclusory allegations in Kennedy’s brief are 
baseless and do not warrant further discussion. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
                                              
2 The District Court did not err in denying leave to amend.  See Grayson v. Mayview 
State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
